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ARTICLES
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF GENETIC SEQUENCING ON THE
AMERICAN HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
FREDERICK LEVY, M.D., J.D.*

JOSEPH F. LAWLER, M.D., Ph.D.**

I. INTRODUCTION

The ability to sequence individual human genomes holds great promise for a
better understanding of disease pathophysiology and susceptibility to disease.'
One hope is that with an increased understanding of how genetic differences
contribute to disease susceptibility, we will be able to identify those individuals at
greatest risk. This ability to identify and treat disease at an earlier stage has
important implications with respect to the manner in which health insurance
delivery can be improved.
With this newly harnessed technology comes enormous responsibility. There
is currently a climate of great apprehension that the information contained in the
human genome and deciphered by the Human Genome Project (HGP)3 will be used
for ill. 2 Many fear that the law will be slow to catch up to the science.
Part II considers the design and implementation of a model for health
insurance in which policies are customized to policyholders based on their genetic
predisposition to a series of diseases. This model is based on the well established
framework of traditional life and health insurance policies. Specifically, it is
reliant on the advantages of distributed risks among a population of insured
individuals.

* Frederick Levy, M.D., J.D., FACEP, is an assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in the
Department of Emergency Medicine. Dr. Levy also serves as a medicolegal consultant for the legal
affairs division at the Johns Hopkins Hospital (Baltimore, MD).
** Joseph Lawler, M.D., Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in the Department
of Urology (Baltimore, MD).
1. Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the Human Genome to Transform the
American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 2 (2002); see also Natalie E. Zindorf,
Discrimination in the 21' Century: Protecting the Privacy of Genetic Information in Employment and
Insurance, 36 TULSA L.J. 703, 703 (2001); NAT'L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (NIH), Div. EXTRAMURAL
RES., Introduction to the Human Genome Project, at
=
http://www.genome.gov/page.cfm?pagelD 10001772.
2. Dorothy C. Wertz, Society and the Not-So-New Genetics: What are We Afraid of? Some
Future Predictionsfrom a Social Scientist, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 299, 300 (1997).
3. See Zindorf, supra note 1, at 703.
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Although it may not be practical to implement such a model today, it will
become increasingly possible to do so as (1) deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
sequencing technology improves, and (2) enough data is accumulated to accurately
assign risk based on genetic polymorphisms. This genetic model has the potential
advantage of maximizing profits and minimizing costs as compared to the
traditional health insurance model by identifying at risk people early.4
Part III then presents a brief survey of the current state of the law. Both the
federal and state regulatory responses to genetic advancements have been slow and
inadequate. The common law appears even less suited to properly deal with
potential problems of discrimination and abuse. All of the legislative and common
law solutions are predicated upon the notion that an actual problem has been
identified and substantiated, an idea that has been called into question by some
5
authors.
Whatever the ultimate application of genomic sequencing, Part IV offers a
brief discussion of the security and privacy aspects that will need to be part of the
calculus. Part V concludes with the observation that while this model has
theoretical promise, disciplines from diverse sections of society will need to work
together to realize the potential for advancement.

II. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A GENETIC SEQUENCING MODEL
A. A BriefHistory of DNA Sequencing
DNA is a polymer that consists of four different monomers or bases.6 The
order in which these monomers appear denotes their sequence. 7 Avery, MacLeod
and McCarthy demonstrated in 1944 that DNA was the genetic material
comprising all organisms. 8 Since then, efforts have been made to determine the
sequence of a given piece of DNA. Various tedious methods were in place when
Maxam and Gilbert described a chemical technique for sequencing DNA in 1977. 9
This method supplanted previous techniques, and despite its limitations, was

4. See generally Roberta M. Berry, The Human Genome Project and the End of Insurance, 7 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205, 231-33 (1996).
5. Mark A. Hall, Legal Rules and Industry Norms: The Impact of Laws Restricting Health
Insurers' Use of Genetic Information, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 93, 98-99 (Fall 1999).
6. Charles Vorndran & Robert L. Florence, Bioinformatics: Patenting the Bridge Between
Information Technology and the Life Sciences, 42 IDEA 93, 96 (2002).
7. Id.
8. Maclyn McCarty, Discovering Genes are Made of DNA, availableat http://dx.doi.org/10.1038
/nature0 1398 (last visited May 19, 2003).
9. See generally Allan M. Maxam & Walter Gilbert, A New Method for Sequencing DNA, 74
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 560 (1977).
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beginning to enjoy widespread use when a biological method was introduced later
0
that year by two-time Nobel Laureate Frederick Sanger.'
Sanger's method can be likened to determining the order of playing cards in a
shuffled deck. Consider a large group of individuals who are playing cards. Each
player is handed an identically shuffled deck and told to "cut the cards," making
note of where they cut the deck and which card was present at that position. No
individual player has enough information to determine the order of all of the cards
in the deck, but by sharing information, they can infer the order of the cards in the
deck. So it is with Sanger sequencing wherein one measures the length of a DNA
fragment and the identity of the base at one end." When enough fragments have
been analyzed, the sequence of the starting material from which the fragments are
derived can be determined.
Sanger's method has undergone a number of improvements since its
inception and it is the technique used today in modem DNA sequencing
instruments. 2 The present instruments can simultaneously determine the sequence
of 1,000 contiguous bases of DNA in several hundred samples.' 3 By way of
14
comparison, the human genome consists of approximately three billion bases.
These instruments, despite the impressive speed with which they operate cannot
resolve billions of contiguous bases and fall short in their ability to sequence a
human genome.
A conceptual breakthrough was provided by Craig Venter and Nobel
Laureate Hamilton Smith. They proposed what became known as the "shotgun"
15
sequencing approach wherein an entire genome is broken into small fragments.
Each of these fragments is sequenced by Sanger's method with automated
instrumentation. 6 Then, with the help of a computer, the sequences are reassembled to construct the original genome sequence.17 This approach can be
likened to randomly fragmenting the alphabet into numerous three letter fragments.

10. See generally Frederick Sanger et al., DNA Sequencing with Chain-terminatingInhibitors, 74
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 5463 (1977).

11. Brian Huseman, Taylor v. State, Rule 706, and the DNA Database:FutureDirections in DNA
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 397,409 (1997).
12. Automated instruments that measure fragment length and base identity have been developed.
Additionally, improvements in instrumentation account most significantly for the current state of the
art. Lloyd M. Smith, Product Options Increase in DNA Sequencing Arena, at http://www.thescientist.com/yr1988/jul/tools_p23_880725.html.
13. OAK RIDGE NAT'L LABORATORY, DEP'T OF ENERGY, Overview of the Human Genome

Project,§ 1 (1997), at http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/publicat/miscpubs/ason/
backgrd.html.
14. Vomdran & Florence, supra note 6, at 97.
15. See generally J. Craig Venter et al., Shotgun Sequencing, 280 Sci. 1540, 1540-42 (1998).

16. Niva Elkin-Koren, Of Scientific Claims and ProprietaryRights: Lessons from the Dead Sea
Scrolls Case, 38 HOus. L. REv. 445,447 (2001).
17. Id.
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Because each fragment possesses some overlap with another fragment, one can
order the individual fragments so as to deduce the sequence of the starting material
(e.g., the alphabet).
The shotgun approach was first applied to microbial genomes and
subsequently the human genome by Craig Venter and colleagues at Celera
Genomics and by the NIH sequencing consortium team led by director Francis S.
Collins. 18 The outcome of these efforts was an announcement by then President
Clinton on June 26, 2000, that the draft sequence of the human genome had been
determined. 19
It is currently impractical to sequence the genomes of several individuals
using the shotgun approach because of the time and costs incurred. It is speculated
that in order for individual genome sequencing to become common, it must cost
less than 1,000 dollars per genome and be completed in less than one week. 20 This
goal led to the development of a number of new sequencing technologies that
differ from Sanger sequencing. 2' These new methods promise to both increase the
throughput and decrease the size of sequencing instrumentation. There is no
Moore's law 22 equivalent for DNA sequencing speed or power. However, if the
past is any predictor, we can expect that in ten to fifteen years it will become
practical to sequence individual human genomes.
B. The TraditionalInsurance Model
Life insurance by its nature, distributes risk across a population. Although
some individuals will pay far less in premiums than the disbursement to their
estate, on average people will pay more in premiums than the value of their
policy. 23 This is how insurers profit. How can this model of life insurance be
applied to health insurance?
Consider a large population of individuals who wish to purchase health
insurance. Further, assume that there are 100 diseases that account for the majority

18. Michael D. Lemonick, Gene Mapper: The Bad Boy of Science has Jump-Started a Biological
Revolution, TIME MAGAZINE, * 1 (2000), http://www.time.com/time/poy2000/mag/venter.html.
19. Id.
20. See generally Mark D. Uehling, Wanted: The $1,000 Genome, BIO-IT WORLD NEWS (2002),
http://www.bio-itworld.com/news/1 11202_reportl 516.html.
21. Id.
22. The observation made, that the number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had
doubled every year since the integrated circuit was invented in 1965 by Gordon Moore, co-founder of
Intel. Moore predicted that this trend would continue for the foreseeable future. In subsequent years, the
pace slowed down a bit, but data density has doubled approximately every eighteen months, and this is
the current definition of Moore's Law, which Moore himself has blessed. Most experts, including
Moore himself, expect Moore's Law to hold for at least another two decades.
23. See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2002).
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of health care costs and that one's likelihood of developing each of these diseases
can be accurately estimated by some combination of a lifestyle questionnaire and
genetic testing. Currently, insurance companies develop questionnaires that
attempt to identify those at higher or lower risk for any of the 100 diseases based
on physical or behavioral parameters and then assign premium payments
accordingly. One might, for example, inquire about smoking history, height,
weight and family history (a precursor to genetic analysis). They may also include
tests such as cholesterol level, blood pressure and HIV infectivity status. This is a
relatively crude means of assigning risk compared to genetic testing but it can be
effective for certain diseases. When combined with genetic testing, it can be much
more predictive.
An insurer might view the risk associated with insuring any large group of
individuals as consisting of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Intrinsic factors might
include risk profiles that are overrepresented in the population being insured. For
example, a population of Ashkenazi Jews might be at higher risk for Tay-Sachs
disease.24 No matter how many individuals in this population are insured, the risk
for Tay-Sachs disease will still be higher than in the African-American population.
Extrinsic risk refers to environmental factors, including trauma and infectious
disease, which occur at some frequency with a near random distribution.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model for which Markowitz, Miller, and Sharpe
shared the 1990 Nobel Prize in economics, states that investors must assume more
risk if they expect a greater return on their investment. We also know that there
are ways of diversifying to minimize risk. The important point from an insurer's
point of view is how one can diversify their insured population to minimize the
risk associated with insuring them. Intrinsic risk can be minimized by insuring a
genetically diverse population. If this is not possible based on the geographic
region in which an insurer operates, then another insurance company can be
enlisted to co-insure the population. The co-insurer helps balance the risk by
insuring individuals from a different genetic background.
Returning to the previous example, two companies may operate in
geographically distinct regions where there are disproportionately high amounts of
Ashkenazi Jews and African-Americans. The incidence of Tay-Sachs disease and

24. Paul J. Edelson, The Tay-Sachs Disease Screening Program in the U.S. as a Model for the
Control of Genetic Disease: An Historical View, 7 HEALTH MATRIX: J. L. MED. 125, 126 (1997). TaySachs disease is a fatal genetic disorder, occurring primarily in children, which results in progressive
destruction of the central nervous system. Id. at 125. Symptoms develop approximately six months
after birth in the form of recurrent seizures and diminishing mental function. Id. Over the course of
five years, the infant's motor skills will gradually regress until the child becomes blind, mentally
retarded, paralyzed, non-responsive, and eventually the child dies. Id.
25. Professor Assar Lindbeck, Presentation of the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel (1990), http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1990/presentationspeech.html (last visited May 19, 2003).
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Sickle Cell 26 disease will tend to be higher in these populations respectively. 27
These two companies may elect to enter into a co-insurance agreement in which
the policy costs for the two populations are pooled. This prevents either insurer
from paying a disproportionate number of claims that are secondary to factors
intrinsic to the insured population.
Extrinsic risk can be minimized by insuring larger numbers of individuals. If
the incidence of traumatic ankle fracture is 1 in 5,000 and the insured pool consists
of 500 people, then the single event in the small pool of individuals can have a
significant impact on costs. However, if 5,000 people are insured, the risk is
distributed over an additional 4,500 premiums, thereby minimizing the likelihood
that a single event will have a significant impact on the economics of the policies.

C. THE THEORETICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF GENOTYPE-GUIDED INSURANCE

1. Most cases
Much in the same way that life insurance companies have employed actuaries
to calculate the average life span of individuals given certain physical and
behavioral characteristics, rapid, whole genome sequencing may enable health
insurers to calculate, with unprecedented accuracy, the average amount of health
care dollars an individual will use. The association of genetic polymorphisms with
disease risk cannot only predict who is most likely to develop a disease but also
when they are most likely to develop it.
To begin, a risk multiple must be assigned to each individual in the policy
group for each disease under consideration. This multiple will be one (1.0) for
individuals at average risk, less than one (<1.0) for individuals at below average
risk, and greater than one (>1.0) for individuals at elevated risk. The risk multiple
increases with the number of genetic risk factors one possesses for a given disease.
For example, if ten polymorphisms are examined to predict one's risk for colon
cancer, an individual who possesses high risk sequences at four of the markers will
be assigned a lower risk multiple than one who possesses seven high risk
sequences.

26. Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy: Rethinking Employee Protections
for a Brave New Workplace, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1497, 1513 (2002). Sickle Cell disease is caused by a
mutation in the hemoglobin-Beta gene. id. Abnormal hemoglobin molecules stick to one another and
form long, rod-like structures which cause red blood cells to become stiff and sickle shape. Id. This
shape causes red blood cells to pile up, causing blockages and damaging vital organs. Id. Individuals
with Sickle Cell disease experience lung tissue damage that causes acute chest syndrome, pain episodes,
and strokes. Id. It also causes damage to the spleen, kidneys, and liver. See also NIH, LEARNING
ABOUT SICKLE CELL DISEASE, http://www.genome.gov/page.cfm?pagelD=10001219 (last visited May
19, 2003).
27. See generally Kim, supra note 26.
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The risk multiple can then be used to assign each individual to a screening
regimen for the disease under consideration. It can also be used to group
individuals in a policy so that they are not all at risk for similar diseases
(minimizing intrinsic risk in the process). When these screening regimens are
distributed over several diseases, one may find that those individuals at risk for
disease number one may not be at risk for disease number two, and vice versa,
which further increases screening efficiency.
Screening regimens are designed with large populations in mind and they
take into account overall disease incidence. Consider the American College of
Gastroenterology's (ACG) recommendations for colon cancer screening.28 The
ACG recommends that all individuals over the age of fifty without significant
family history of colon cancer receive an initial colonoscopy and then one
colonoscopy every ten years thereafter. 29 An alternative to this regimen is annual
fecal occult blood tests and sigmoidoscopy every five years.30
While some
individuals will be screened too intensively by this regimen and others not
intensively enough, on the average, lives will be saved.
Armed with more accurate, genetic risk predictors, we can customize
screening regimens to the individual thereby identifying disease at an earlier stage
when it can be treated more effectively. The underlying theme is to more wisely
spend each health care dollar and, in doing so, create a more efficient insurance
policy that leads to better care for individual policyholders, less expensive policy
premiums, and greater profits for the insurers.
Take as another example Familial Adenomatous Polyposis (FAP), a genetic
disease with an incidence of approximately 1 in 8,000 that invariably results in
colon cancer.3 ' Individuals with mutations in the adenomatous polyposis coli gene
(APC) account for greater than 95% of FAP cases. 32 Individuals with FAP
33
develop thousands of pre-cancerous polyps beginning at sixteen years of age.
The treatment for FAP is prophylactic colectomy which is curative. 34 In certain
instances, disease severity can be estimated from the nature of the individual's
APC mutation. FAP is not an especially common disease but it illustrates the point

28. AM.

COLL.

OF GASTROENTEROLOGY,

RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR COLORECTAL

CANCER

PREVENTION, at http://www.acg.gi.org/patientinfo/cc/patcards.htm (last visited May 19, 2003).
29. See generally id.
30. Id. See also Hall et al., Measuring Medical Practice Patterns: Sources of Evidence From
Health Services Research, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 779, 816 (2002) (citing the 1997 American Cancer
Society guidelines for appropriate colon cancer screening, which includes annual fecal occult blood
testing with sigmoidoscopy every five years).
31. Cindy Solomon & Randall W. Burt, Familial Adenomatous Polyposis, available at
http://www.genetests.org/servlet/access?db-geneclinics&site=gt&id=8888891 &key=QKovxra4E INe&gry-&fcn=y&fw-aAqQ&filename=/profiles/fap/index.html (last visited May 19, 2003).
32. See generally id.

33. Id.
34. Id.
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well that with advanced genetic knowledge, one can successfully interrupt an
otherwise fatal disease process.
A clear distinction must be made between money spent on screening and
profit garnered. The amount of money spent on screening by a genetic-based
insurer will be no less than that spent by a traditional health insurer. In this
respect, the policies are indistinguishable. The difference is that a genetic based
insurer will more effectively target their screening so that disease processes are
identified earlier when successful intervention is more likely. Successful early
intervention is what permits a greater profit because disease is generally much less
expensive to treat at an earlier stage than at a later, disseminated stage.

2. What About Individuals at Known Low Risk?
One might wonder why those individuals who know they are at average or
below average risk for all of the diseases in question want to participate in such a
system. While genetic analysis can assign relative risk, it cannot assign absolute
risk. Therefore, individuals with a genetic low risk profile may in fact be at higher
risk for a given disease based on their lifestyle and/or habits. In addition, when
comparing these "average risk" individuals to above average risk individuals, one
must be clear that the term "risk" applies only to the specific disease in question.
When this analysis is extended to hundreds of different diseases, the number of
individuals at average or below average risk for all of the diseases becomes
exceedingly small.

3. Unpreventable and UntreatableDiseases
An interesting question arises when one considers a disease for which
efficient genetic screening exists but no effective prevention or treatments are
available. An example is Huntington's Chorea, an autosomal dominant disease,
for which genetic tests of nearly 100% accuracy exist but for which no effective
treatment or prevention has been identified. 5 If an individual tests positive for a
mutated Huntington gene then they will develop the disease with nearly 100%

35. Brian R. Gin, Genetic Discrimination: Huntingtons Disease and the Americans With
DisabilitiesAct, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1406, 1414-15 (1997). Huntington's chorea, or Huntington's
disease, is a genetic disease in which individuals will not develop symptoms until mid-life. Id.
Symptoms include an extended period of dementia and loss of body control, with a destruction of
memory and speech until the disease results in death. Id.
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develop the disease can also be predicted
certainty. 36 The age at which individuals
37
from the Huntington gene structure.

This is an example of a disease where, because of the age of onset and the
lack of treatment and prevention options, an insurer might be tempted either to
exclude the insured with this mutation from purchasing a policy, or to exclude the
disease in question.
4. PracticalReasons Minimizing the Likelihood ofDiscrimination
There may be some pecuniary and practical reasons that militate against
insurance companies using genetic information to discriminate against "genetically
adverse" individuals. As a threshold matter, death is an inevitable event that will
likely be the end result of a disease process. Humans all begin their journey in life
with a genetic slate that contains several "marks." These marks are the
polymorphisms that predispose us to certain diseases and make us less likely to
develop others. It is a genetic truism that none of us start with a perfect slate.
From the perspective of an insurer, failure to offer a policy to any individual with
some disease predisposition effectively reduces the customer base.
One might be inclined to ask why an insurer would not simply insure the
average or below average risk individuals only. If these individuals were the only
ones insured, then over 99% of the health insurance buying market have not been
sold a product. This is poor business strategy irrespective of what good or service
is being provided. These average or below average risk individuals are worth
including in a larger insurance pool to better distribute risk. As a practical matter,
an approach in which only a minority of customers with average, or below average
risk for all of the diseases in the screen are offered policies might well become a
public relations nightmare that may generate sufficient public discontent so as to
damage the company.
Furthermore, health insurance companies are quite profitable in the absence
of genetic profiling. It seems unlikely that they would adopt a strategy that might
make them more profitable on a customer-by-customer basis but reduce overall
profitability by severely constricting that base. Consider also the myriad behavioral
and environmental factors that contribute to one's health. Even if an individual
with a "clean slate" could be identified, that person may still amass tremendous
heath care costs as the result of an accident, drug or alcohol abuse, exposure to an
environmental toxin, infectious agent or a poor diet.

36. Id.
37. Mahbubal Huq & Michael R. Hayden, Huntington's Disease, *1 (1998),
http://www.genetests.org/servlet/access?db=geneclinics&site=gt&id=8888891&key-EQOhI85elPYMA
&gry=&fcn=y&fw=-QbCr&filename=/profiles/huntington/index.html.
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A model can be envisioned in which insurance companies are only allowed to
access information on those genes which lead to a disease phenotype that can be
prevented, and/or treated. A list of these genes would be maintained by the
government. To be added to the list, a genetic association would have to withstand
the scrutiny of a panel of scientists in much the same way that drugs are granted
approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). In this model, the insured
population will include, at some low frequency, individuals who have untreatable,
fatal diseases that have a relatively early age of onset. Because these individuals
are present in the insured population at a low frequency, the cost of their treatment
is effectively distributed. This approach necessitates a third party regulator of
genetic information (discussed infra, in part IV).

III. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE LEGAL ISSUES

A health insurance model that relies exclusively on free market competition
to guard against discrimination would be naive. In fact, society has recognized as
much, as evidenced by the explosion of state and federal regulatory responses to
the HGP as well as the proliferation of scholarly commentary on the subject.38
Lawmakers have recognized that using a genetic sequencing model as a tool for
enhanced medical underwriting has the potential to tempt insurance companies to
discriminate against "risk adverse" individuals.39
In the most general terms, fears about undue discrimination center around
concerns that insurance companies might use genetic information to make unfair
decisions about insurance coverage, premiums and exclusions. 40 The mantra goes
that insurance companies, if left unchecked, would be tempted to use genetic
information about asymptomatic people with genetic predispositions for disease to
adversely risk stratify them. The resultant conflict between individual privacy
rights and unrestricted access to genetic information raises issues such as: who
should have access?; who has the right to such information?; is it a right or an
41
interest?; and how will the information be used?
These thorny issues, each with its attendant theoretical risks, have led to
several contemporaneous debates over the most equitable way to deal with this
risk. One of the most notable threshold debates is over the fundamentally different

38. See discussion infra Part III B.
39. Sheryl Stolberg, InsuranceFalls Prey to Genetic Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994, availableat
1994 WL 2148771.
40. See Geetter, supra note 1, at 2.
41. Nathalie Smith, The Right to Genetic Privacy? Are We Unlocking the Secrets of the Genome
Only to Risk Insuranceand Employment Discrimination?,2000 UTAH L. REv. 705, 707 (2000).
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scholars in
nature of genetic information. This difference has lead many notable
42
the field of genomics to coin the phrase "genetic exceptionalism.
A. Exceptionalism

The corollary to this "exceptional" genetic information is that this
information is deserving of its own set of rules.43 However, as at least one critic
has noted, "this argument responds well to public fears and tugs at the collective
apprehension.. .the theory is fundamentally flawed and shortsighted.""
Specifically, critics argue that genetic information is no different than other classes
of medical information.

45

They further contend that genetics legislation, though well intentioned, is
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. 46 The real problem is the risk-taking
inherent in medical underwriting, a problem not just specific to genomics but the
entire insurance industry process. 47 The thrust of any new legislation should be
aimed at revamping the laws that inadequately protect the more general notions of
medical privacy.48 Some authors believe that, in the area of insurance, genetic
information properly lies in the broader category of confidentiality of the medical
record.4 9

B. An Overview of CurrentLegislative Protections
With continuing advances in genomic technology, state and federal
policymakers have responded by addressing the potential for abuse with several
rapid generations of genetic legislation. 50 Most of these laws currently embody
this concept of "genetic exceptionalism."51

42. See Geetter, supra note 1, at 56-57 ("Genetic exceptionalism is the theory that genetic
information departs sufficiently radically from other types of genetic information so that the new rules
are necessary to govern the collection and dissemination of genetic information.") (citing the N.Y. Task
Force on Life & the Law, Genetic Testing and Screening in the Age of Genomic Medicine 97 (2000)).
43. See Geetter, supranote 1, at 57.
44. Id.
45. Natalie E. Zindorf, Discrimination in the 21st Century: Protecting the Privacy of Genetic
Information in Employment and Insurance,36 TULSA L.J. 703,724 (2001).
46. Sonia M. Suter, The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special
Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 669, 672 (2001). Not all genetic information requires
protective legislation, which makes genetics legislation over-inclusive. At the same time, a great deal of
other medical information shares many of the features of genetic information that have inspired
legislation, which makes it dramatically under-inclusive. Id. at 671.
47. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and The Law: An
End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 21 (1999).
48. See Geetter, supra note 1, at 2-3.
49. See Zindorff, supranote 45, at 724.
50. See Smith, supra note 41, at 727-33.
51. See Suter, supra note 46, at 727-28.
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1. FederalLaw
The federal government's first indirect attempt to regulate this area came with
the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in
1996.52 HIPAA applies primarily to governmental insurance plans (e.g., Medicare
and Medicaid), and large and small group health plans,53 but not to the individual
health insurance market.54
Many of the relevant HIPAA provisions prohibit the covered companies from
using either genetic test results or, more broadly, genetic information when making
decisions regarding eligibility, premium rate setting and exclusions.55 The net
effect of these sorts of provisions is to try and limit or eliminate the ability of the
insurance companies to use genetic information as a tool for medical
underwriting.56
Not surprisingly, insurance companies feel that HIPAA's current
proscriptions are more than enough to discourage the industry from using genetic
information in an unfair manner. They claim that subsequent regulation will
overly burden the industry practice of risk selection and add to the already existing
confusion.57
Critics charge that the federal law allows too many gaps that insurance
companies could potentially stride through. 8 Most importantly, private consumers
seeking health insurance in the individual market are not covered.59 Another
deficiency relates to the possibility for the health insurance company to "pass
down" discriminatory practice and thus indirectly obviate HIPAA's protective
mandates. 60 A large insurance carrier can "pass down" discriminatory practices by
offering incentive programs to employers to cover low risk individuals, which

52. See Smith, supra note 41, at 727-31.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (2000).
54. See id.
55. See Smith, supra note 41, at 729.
56. See Geetter, supra note 1, at 47-48.
57. See generally Carol Lee, Creating A Genetic Underclass: The Potential for Genetic
Discriminationby the Health InsuranceIndustry, 13 PACE. L. REv. 189 (1993).
58. See generally Jennifer Krumm, Genetic Discrimination: Why Congress Must Ban Genetic
Testing in the Workplace, 23 J. LEGAL MED. 491 (2002), WL 23 JLEGMD 491; see also, e.g., Lisa M.
Caperna & Robert A. Curley, Jr., The Brave New World is Here: Privacy Issues and the Human
Genome Project, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 22 (2003), WL 70 DEFCJ 22; Melody Simmons, A Weekly
Checkup on Health Care Costs and Coverage: Managed Care and Genetic Tests, WASH. POST, July 2,
2002, availableat 2002 WL 22785226.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2000). The new security regulations that became effective 4/21/2003, do
little to narrow the regualtory gap. Rather, they pertain more generally to refining some of the security
provisions with respect to confidentiality of the electronic medical record. See generally 68 Fed. Reg.
(http//:www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html) ( last visited May 19, 2003).
60. See Smith, supra note 41, at 731.
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includes those without genetic predispositions to disease [under the guise of socalled "health promotion and disease prevention company policies"]. 6'
Yet another regulatory gap exists as a result of certain HIPAA provisions that
allow insurance companies to define the term "eligible individual. 62 While other
parts of the law try and prohibit outright eligibility exclusions, 63 companies are not
restricted in the amount of insurance that they have to provide individuals with
genetic predispositions.64

2. State Laws
There are currently some 41 states with laws prohibiting or limiting
companies from using genetic information to make coverage decisions. 65 Many of
these states impose an outright ban on the use of genetic information all together.66
A few states make a distinction between genetic information and genetic testing.67
Those states with statutes that specifically name permitted uses of genetic
information are thought to be deficient in allowing companies to circumvent the
law. For example, states might specifically ban limiting coverage or adjusting
benefits but fail to address topics such as using genetic information to cover
premiums. 68 State statutes also suffer from the same incompleteness of the federal
statute in that many do not cover the private sector of the insurance market.69
Another perceived problem with the states' response to this issue has been
with state regulation of self insured group plans. These plans are actually
considered employee benefits and as such, are governed by the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 70
Since ERISA pre-empts state

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 731-32 (citing another HIPAA provision that notes that insurers are not limited to the
amount of insurance to be provided. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2000)).
64. Id.
65. NIH, State Legislation: Genetic Information and Health Insurance,
http://www.genome.gov/10002338 (last visited May 19, 2003) [hereinafter State Legislation].
66. See generally Hall, supranote 5.
67. See generally State Legislation, supra note 65. For example, Alabama and Arizona define
genetic test whereas California and Colorado more broadly define genetic information. Insurance
companies tend to prefer those states with a more narrow proscription against testing, allowing them to
still potentially use genetic information. Id.
68. See generally William F. Mullholland & Ami S. Jaeger, Genetic Privacy and Discrimination:
A Survey of State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 317 (1999).
69. See generally Gostin & Hodges Jr., supranote 47.
70. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1461 (2000).
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regulation of employee benefits including health insurance, 71 large-self insured
72
plans may opt to switch to ERISA governed plans to escape state regulation.

3. The Courts
While some writers feel that the courts could handle potential disputes
generated in this area,73 most commentators feel that the common law would be
too slow to respond to a rapidly changing field and that the courts do not possess
adequate technical expertise to handle these types of cases.74 Proponents of a
legislative solution point to the ability of the legislative branch to delegate to the
agencies the power and authority to generate procedures and criteria to address
problems as they arise.75 The courts could then refine the subtleties of these issues
through case law.76
C. Has there been any Actual Discrimination?
For some in society, it seems the fear of discrimination is proportional to the
speed of genetic sequencing. But is this fear borne out by any empirical evidence?
Often times, it seems like technology outpaces the law and the law must "catch
up." In the area of genomics, however, one could argue the opposite is true.
While the argument is not a literal one, Shakespeare might have been tempted to
wonder if all this sound and fury was much ado about not much.77
There have been some claims of genetic discrimination in the area of health
insurance although they have been more frequent in the employment sector.78

71. See generally FMC Corp. v. Holiday, 498 U.S. 52 (2000).
72. Geetter, supra note 1, at 46-47, citing Amy Darby, The Individual, Health Hazardous
Lifestyles, Disease and Liability, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 787, 796 (1999) (noting the 20%
increase in self-insured plans between 1982 and 1986).
73. See generally Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and PropertyTheory, 87 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1037 (1993).
74. See generally Michael M.J. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in Genetic Material:
Stepping into the Futurewith the Genetic PrivacyAct, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 109 (1996).
75. Jack F. Williams, A Regulatory Modelfor Genetic Testing in Employment, 40 OKLA. L. REV.
181 (1987).
76. See generally Lin, supra note 74.
77. See Much Ado About Nothing: An Analysis of the Play by Shakespeare, available at
http://www.theatrehistory.com/british/muchado00l.html
(last visited May 19, 2003), originally
published in 13 THE DRAMA: ITS HISTORY, LITERATURE AND INFLUENCE ON CIVILIZATION, 167-70
(Alfred Bates ed., London: Historical Pub. Co. 1906).
78. NIH, Genetic Information andHealth Insurance EnactedLegislation,
http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/Policy andpublic-affairs/Legislation/insure.htm (last visited May 19, 2003).
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Since screening is so new and many people avoid it for fear of discrimination, the
evidence that it occurs has been largely anecdotal.79
For example, stories about parents who are unable to obtain insurance for
their children because of a primary hereditary defect 8 and insurance companies
threatening to cancel insurance based on the results of prenatal testing are
surfacing with greater frequency.8 Some commentators believe that the use of
genetic information in medical underwriting is occurring.82
The health insurance industry claims that insurers are not conducting genetic
testing on individuals as a prerequisite for coverage. 83 Insurers argue that current
state and federal regulations protecting genetic information makes using genetic
information as a prerequisite for coverage unlikely. 84 This would seem to be
supported by an often quoted empiric study done by Professor Mark Hall who
85
found that actual cases of genetic discrimination are at present, very infrequent.
To assess the impact of genetic discrimination laws, Professor Hall conducted
a study in seven states, using in-depth questionnaires and extensive interviews with
representatives from most of the major health insurers, most of the major medical
centers that do clinical genetics work, and insurance agents specializing in health
insurance.86
He found, from several independent sources, that genetic
discrimination by insurers was very low or nonexistent in states with and without
87
these laws, both before the laws were enacted and afterwards.
Insurance regulators, for example, were completely puzzled why this was an
issue of public concern. Many complained that "this was a stupid issue" ... that
they felt "frustrated" by having to spend $250,000 on a task force looking for
evidence of genetic discrimination, without finding a single case. 88 Hall suggests

79. See generally Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearing Before the House Comm. on

Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Francis S. Collins, Director,
NIH), availableat 2000 WL 1115522.

80. See Catherine Arnst, Should Bad Genes Rob You ofLife or Health Insurance? Rapid Progress
in Identifying Genes That Pre-dispose People to Hereditary Diseases Is Starting to Raise a Major
Ethical Dilemma, TORONTO STAR SUNDAY EDITION, Sept. 15, 1991, available at LEXIS, News Group

File.
81. See generally, Natalie Anne Stepanuk, Genetic Information and Third Party Access to
Information: New Jersey's Pioneering Legislation as a Model for Federal Privacy Protection of
Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1118 (1998).
82. See generally Jon Beckwith & Joseph S. Alper, Reconsidering Genetic Antidiscrimination
Legislation, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 205 (1998).
83. Press Release, Health Insurance Association of America, Health Insurance and Genetic
Information: Just the Facts, Please (June 21, 1998),
available at http://www.hiaa.org/search/content.cfm?ContentlD=570 (last visited May 19, 2003).
84. See Smith, supra note 41, at 724.
85. See Hall, supra note 5, at 98.
86. Id. at 96.
87. Id. at 98.
88. Id. at 103.
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that these laws, while not currently needed, might help serve as a deterrent for
insurance companies and thereby convince the industry that it would not be
89
appropriate or legitimate to use such information.

IV. SECURITY/CONFIDENTIALITY ISSUES

An insurance model based on genetic risk assessment such as the one profiled
above, requires that extensive measures be taken to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the genetic information obtained. It is likely that from the
insured's point of view, all that will be required is a blood sample. However, what
happens from the time the sample is obtained to the time a policy is offered is
considerably more complicated.
High-throughput DNA sequencing technologies of the future will likely rely
on an approach wherein all DNA sequence information is obtained simultaneously.
In this setting, it becomes impractical to only sequence certain parts of an
individual's genome or only specific genes. Because the entire genome will be
sequenced, it is of practical importance that an individual be able to "block" access
to certain genetic information. A second practical concern is whether or not
sequence information may be obtained locally or off-site. This will depend to a
large extent on whether or not the inventors of high-throughput sequencing
technology plan to be a service provider or a machine and reagent provider. If the
technology exists but the inventors are unwilling to sell the instruments, exploiting
sequencing technology could prove problematic to implement.
Whether the DNA sequence information is obtained at the insurance
company or at a contractor's facility, this is the first link in a chain of persons and
corporations who have access to the insured's genetic information. Each option
has its theoretical benefits and liabilities. If the sequence information is obtained
locally at the insurance company, then the number of persons with access to the
information is reduced because a contractor is not involved. However, by
obtaining the sequence information itself, the insurance company will have access
to information that a prospective policy holder may not want them to have.
Employing a third-party contractor to obtain the sequence information can
potentially guarantee that the insurance company only has access to certain limited
information, but the tradeoff is it increases the number of individuals with access
to the information.
The following can serve as a useful analogy for securing genetic information.
Suppose Alice wants to send a package to Bob. This package contains a compact
disc (CD) that contains an encrypted form of Bob's genetic information. Alice
encloses the disc in a box, places a lock on it and mails it to Bob. Bob, upon

89. Id. at 115,120.
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receiving the package, places a second lock of his choosing on the box and mails it
back to Alice. Alice removes the lock she originally placed on the box and once
again mails it to Bob. Finally, Bob can remove the lock he originally applied to
the box and access the CD. The advantage of this scheme is that Alice and Bob
can securely exchange information without knowing the combination of each
other's locks.
Let us now translate this analogy to our question of securing genetic
information. An individual may approach an insurance provider or providers and
request a policy customized to his genetic profile. The insurers request that the
individual have his genome sequenced so that the information may be used to
customize a policy. The individual may approach any one of a number of DNA
sequencing service providers and request that his genome be sequenced. He can
do this anonymously by purchasing a kit that contains a lancet for obtaining a
blood sample, a collection device such as paper card, an envelope to mail the
sample, and a "card" that contains a unique identifying number that corresponds to
the envelope.
The individual encloses a non-identifying form of payment and sends off the
sample. After his genome has been sequenced, the information is encrypted, and
mailed to a local post-office. The location of this post-office is specified by the
individual but is not written on the card to prevent an unauthorized third-party
from intercepting the package. The individual then picks up the information by
displaying the appropriate "card."
In this setting, the DNA sequence is obtained anonymously. The sequencing
service provider may perform any one of a number of statistical surveys on the
data obtained from multiple indiviauals however they will not be able to directly
identify them. 90 The individual, now in possession of an encrypted, electronic
copy of the DNA sequence of his genome returns it to the insurance company. In
addition to his entire genome sequence, the individual is provided with a separate
disk that contains unencrypted sequence information for those genes known to
confer susceptibility to a given disease. This list of genes will be the same as those
approved for screening purposes by the FDA.91
If the individual must renew his policy or switch to another insurer, then he
may need to provide additional genetic information. For example, more genes may
have been approved for screening purposes by the FDA. Because the individual

90. This last statement is not entirely true in that it may be possible to determine a number of an
individual's features based on their DNA sequence information. Traits that could be determined include
race, hair and eye color, blood type and possibly facial features.
91. Although having a hard-copy is nice, there is no particular reason why this entire transaction
could not be performed electronically to ensure the anonymity of the individual. For example, the
individual could access his information by providing a code that was supplied in the blood draw kit and
then simply download the information.
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has a copy of his entire genome sequence on disc, he need only go to the
sequencing company's web page, enter the security code he was supplied with at
the time of initial sequencing and click "update." This will un-encrypt those genes
that have been added to the list of approved genes since his last update. A second
blood draw and DNA sequencing payment are obviated yet the identity of the
individual remains confidential.
The insurance company now requests that he provide sequence information
pertaining to a collection of genes that are important for determining the specifics
of a policy. Only information on those genes that are associated with diseases
deemed amenable to prevention and or treatment may be requested. The disc
containing sequence information pertaining to the aforementioned subset of genes
is provided to the insurance company. This guarantees that the insurance company
only accesses the relevant information.
V. CONCLUSION

The technology required to effect rapid, whole genome sequencing will likely
become available within the next decade. There are many potential uses of this
technology. A model for health insurance in which screening guidelines are
customized to an individual policy holder is presented. This model strives to
simultaneously deliver better health care to the insured and increase profits for the
insurer. The model presented posits that insurers may have practical reasons to
refrain from using genetic information in a discriminatory manner.
Even imputing the worst motives to insurance companies, there has been an
ongoing debate as to whether a special branch of "exceptionalism" law is needed to
address the potential for abuse. Whether there have even been serious instances of
actual discrimination is a matter in which reasonable minds have differed.
Nonetheless, federal and state responses have been expansive but there remain
serious open questions about the adequacy of the responses.
Finally, insurance models that use genetic information will require excellent
security to ensure that genetic information remains private. An anonymous system
in which DNA sequence information is gathered by a third party will be required in
order to safeguard the confidentiality of this genetic information.
Sequencing of the human genome is a technology whose time has "almost"
arrived. This model of using sequencing to design a health insurance system has
tremendous potential. Scientists and informatics specialists will have to work
closely with policymakers to guide this technology through unchartered waters.
Former Vice President Al Gore, speaking before the National Academy of Science,
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may have captured this idea best when he said, "[s]cience and
society must always
92
advance together, for neither can ever truly advance alone".

92. Press Release, Office of the Vice President, Vice President Calls for Legislation on Genetic
Discrimination (Jan. 20, 1998). available at 1998 WL 7378521.

